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- <text id=94TT0450>
- <title>
- Apr. 25, 1994: Confounded By The Chinese Puzzle
- </title>
- <history>
- TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1994
- Apr. 25, 1994 Hope in the War against Cancer
- </history>
- <article>
- <source>Time Magazine</source>
- <hdr>
- TRADE, Page 39
- Confounded By The Chinese Puzzle
- </hdr>
- <body>
- <p>A prospective arms sale leaves Beijing--and much of Washington--mystified about U.S. policy
- </p>
- <p>By Kevin Fedarko--Reported by Elaine Shannon and Kenneth R. Timmerman/Washington
- and Mia Turner/Beijing
- </p>
- <p> Little wonder no one knows what U.S. policy toward China is
- these days. At the same time that Clinton Administration officials
- are threatening to curtail trade by revoking Beijing's most-favored-nation
- status because of China's dismal human-rights record, the Administration
- is quietly poised to approve one of the largest sales of U.S.
- military hardware and technology ever to the People's Liberation
- Army. The deal, which could be worth as much as $2 billion,
- involves gas turbine engines. The Chinese say they want to use
- them for jets, but some nuclear nonproliferation experts insist
- that Beijing has more sinister plans.
- </p>
- <p> While the transaction involves neither military secrets nor
- cutting-edge American technology, it has nevertheless become
- a symbol of confusion within the Administration. The deal circumvents
- trade sanctions on military equipment enacted after the 1989
- Tiananmen Square massacre and appears to contravene Defense
- Department efforts to engage China in defense conversion, not
- modernization. To benefit an American company, the U.S. may
- allow the transfer of equipment that some experts say could
- enable China to develop a longer-range cruise missile, capable
- of lofting nuclear warheads as far as Japan and India. If approved,
- the sale would provide a graphic demonstration of the constant
- collision of competing goals in Bill Clinton's foreign policy:
- protecting human rights, controlling proliferation of weapons
- of mass destruction and nurturing American trade.
- </p>
- <p> The deal began in 1987, when Garrett, an engine company based
- in Phoenix, Arizona, beat out rivals from France, Britain and
- Canada for a contract to supply engines to Nanchang Aircraft,
- a Chinese government-owned manufacturer. Nanchang said it needed
- the engines for a light military jet trainer, the K-8, that
- was destined to be sold abroad. In November 1991, the U.S. Commerce
- Department, which had been moving aggressively to promote American
- trade by cutting through export barriers, quietly dropped national
- security controls originally imposed during the cold war, allowing
- the engines to be shipped to China without an export license.
- </p>
- <p> As the first order of goods was being shipped, however, the
- picture changed again. Officials at the Defense Technology Security
- Administration learned about the deal after they read a wire
- between the U.S. embassy in Beijing and the State Department.
- Fearing that China intended to use the Garrett engine to extend
- the range and payload capacity of its Silkworm missile, the
- agency raised furious objections.
- </p>
- <p> Garrett's parent company, AlliedSignal, had no intention of
- abandoning the sale--especially since the Chinese by then
- had expressed interest in purchasing as many as 500 engines
- over 20 years. Including service and peripherals, the company
- estimated the deal could gross $500 million and support 440
- jobs at Garrett and its subcontractors. AlliedSignal's lobbyists
- began pressing the Pentagon to drop its opposition. To dispel
- fears that the engines might be used for missiles, AlliedSignal's
- spokesman Arch Niesmith told congressional investigators not
- to worry. "Our engine has a diameter of nearly three feet,"
- he said, "whereas a cruise missile is roughly one-third that
- size." Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and his
- deputy Mitch Wallerstein signed off on the deal. Wallerstein
- circulated a memo predicting that AlliedSignal's sales to China
- might soar to 2,000 engines. The company quickly disavowed Wallerstein's
- numbers as unrealistic after critics within the Department of
- Defense began questioning China's need for so many jet trainers.
- </p>
- <p> Some nonproliferation experts take issue with AlliedSignal's
- claim that the engines cannot be adapted to an improved Chinese
- cruise missile. Within the Defense Technology Security Administration,
- specialists are worried that the engine is perfectly suited
- to powering a long-range cruise missile. CIA studies have warned
- that if AlliedSignal sells not just the engine but the technology
- to build it, China will gain high-quality military technology,
- which could be used for a new generation of cruise missiles.
- Even more disturbing is the conclusion of an internal Defense
- Department study. A missile such as this, say the authors, would
- put most of the rest of Asia within range of a Chinese nuclear
- attack.
- </p>
- <p> No less worrisome is the possibility that unless China curbs
- its profligacy in peddling weapons to virtually anyone with
- the cash to pay for them, the improved missiles could wind up
- in the hands of countries like Syria, Iran and Pakistan--all
- three of which have long bought missiles from Beijing.
- </p>
- <p> But other experts say such analysis is unnecessarily alarmist
- and damaging to American business. "I think those engines don't
- mean squat," says Charles Bernard, a former Pentagon official.
- "The French make an engine that size, as well as the Brits and
- the Germans. A lot of people would sell them an engine. There
- are mysterious, scary transactions, but this ain't one."
- </p>
- <p> Regardless of whether the engine eventually becomes the centerpiece
- of a Chinese cruise missile, the Garrett deal undermines the
- noisy debate over whether the U.S. should extend China's most-favored-nation
- status. Viewed against the backdrop of assurances by Secretary
- of State Warren Christopher that the Clinton Administration
- will cut off MFN unless China improves its human-rights behavior,
- the Garrett sale only reinforces Beijing's impression that U.S.
- demands are a charade.
- </p>
-
- </body>
- </article>
- </text>
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